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Source: *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 6 (1993), pp. 953-972

Published by: [Taylor & Francis, Ltd.](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152664>

Accessed: 26/03/2013 14:11

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Moscow's Acceptance of NATO: The Catalytic Role of German Unification

GERHARD WETTIG

Differing ideas about a post-confrontationist Europe

DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD relations in Europe were shaped by both East–West confrontation and Germany's division. The two phenomena were rooted in the systemic conflict between the West and the USSR. Two Western schools of thought emerged as to how the rift might be overcome. The first held that a fair deal was possible with the communists. The second doubted whether such an option existed. Only a crisis of communism would create the conditions for a substantial and lasting accommodation. The two sides' ideas on the kind of solution differed as well. The fair deal school of thought expected a middle-of-the-road compromise, whereas the crisis thinkers felt an essentially Western-type outcome to be natural.

During the decade after 1945 public attention focused primarily on German division and unification. While most of Germany's neighbours were not unhappy about their enemy of World War II being divided and hence weakened, George Kennan advocated a German unity settlement on the basis of East–West military disengagement in Central Europe.¹ The 1950s also saw an intensive West German debate on 'missed opportunities for reunification', particularly with regard to Stalin's note of 10 March 1952.² The premise was that German unity on a democratic basis could have been bought from the Soviet leadership if the Western side had been willing to trade West German rearmament and membership in the Western 'military bloc'.

In the 1960s and 1970s security in Europe through East–West deconfrontation became the principal issue. Both *modus vivendi* détente and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process demonstrate that the West was prepared to seek agreement along these lines. In the end, however, no more than some kind of fragile co-existence resulted which did not do away with what remained an essentially confrontationist East–West relationship.

It was only when communism entered a phase of crisis and collapse that East–West antagonism was overcome. Unexpectedly, the issue of German unity then also imposed itself with elemental force.³ For a few months, the Gorbachev leadership tried to contain East German protest within the bounds of decommunisation, so as to leave the GDR's separate statehood intact. The effort was to no avail.⁴ At the end of

January 1990 the CPSU Secretary General understood at last that he was unable to stem the tide of German unification, given the fact that the USSR was unwilling both to use brute force in the GDR and to pour massive subsidies into the country. He eventually acquiesced in the process of German unity, which he wrongly thought would be slow and gradual in nature.⁵

Confrontation in Europe and division of Germany were on the wane as a result of communist collapse in Central Europe. As it turned out, the Marxist-Leninist perception that 'socialism' was incompatible with Western 'capitalism', or 'imperialism', and hence could not but be in an antagonistic relationship with it, had been the impediment to East-West agreement. The crisis school of thought was proved right. Two related questions, however, remained open. Which would come first and which second—European security or German unity? And what would be the structures of European security in the future—something new based on pan-Europeanism or an essentially Western-type arrangement?

Ever since the 1960s it had been generally assumed in the West that German unity, if it became a real possibility again at all, could result only from preceding agreement on European security which would solve the German problem for the neighbouring peoples. But what emerged in early 1990 was a German unification dynamism which gained momentum before any kind of European security framework had been prepared. Would it be possible to negotiate *ex post* what had not been generated by the preceding development? The lack of structures of European security would imply German unification without the European safeguard hitherto deemed essential. This was the problem which the big powers, *inter alia* the USSR, had to face early in 1990.

Until then only a few thoughts had addressed the question of how European security might be structured in concrete terms after the end of bloc confrontation. The crisis school of thought, as represented, *inter alia*, by Adenauer and also by Kennan during his 'containment' years,⁶ expected Western normalcy to prevail again. This, however, was abhorred by the advocates of détente. Egon Bahr expounded the idea that German division had to be cured by 'change through rapprochement'. Western acceptance of the communists as partners was to provide the basis for the communists' increasing willingness to allow for change and transformation in their power sphere.⁷ The German nation was to continue by means of contact across the East-West divide.

Blueprints for post-confrontationist security in Europe

In Bahr's perspective, European security also required restructuring in the interests of overcoming bloc confrontation. Four successive steps were envisaged. After international acceptance of the GDR, establishment of relations between Bonn and all Warsaw Pact countries, and negotiations on military forces reduction in Germany (policies which had then been implemented since the early 1970s), creation of a European security system including the two German states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Denmark, and the Benelux countries appeared essential. All American and Soviet forces were seen as candidates for withdrawal from these countries. Also NATO and the Warsaw Pact were scheduled for dissolution. The two leading powers

on either side, the US and the USSR, were to remain outside the envisaged collective European security system but to guarantee its inviolability from outside attack.⁸

There was a Soviet alternative to Bahr's ideas on European security. In January 1990 two semi-official articles were published in Moscow to add perspective to the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact's communist structures and to define better guarantees for the USSR's security in the future.⁹ The gist of the argument was that the Warsaw Pact had been a Soviet-enforced alliance with only involuntary, and hence useless, contributions from the other allies. In addition to that, the USSR had to pay dearly for a mere semblance of allied solidarity. Therefore it was seen as a positive rather than a negative result that the allies' recent decommunisation had broken the old mould, for this would allow genuine solidarity with the USSR. At the same time, the Soviet side indicated that the obligations under the Warsaw Treaty had to be transformed. Communality was to be more political than military in character; unwilling allies had to be permitted to turn into partners with sub-alliance responsibilities, largely according to the model of Soviet-Finnish relations. Economic considerations were prominent in this concept.¹⁰

The Kremlin's acceptance of the breathtaking anti-communist development in the 'outer empire' notwithstanding, the concept implied an essentially conservative approach to European security. It posited continuation of the Warsaw Pact as before, if on a different political basis. The underlying premise was that there would be no fundamental change in the previous pattern, which had been characterised by the existence of two blocs facing each other in Europe. At the time the two articles were written, the GDR was still seen as a separate state which would remain part of the Eastern alliance in the foreseeable future.

Options for European security early in 1990

Shortly afterwards, however, it became clear that Germany would unify and that, as a result, the GDR's participation in the Warsaw Pact was jeopardised. Stabilisation of the old security system on a modified basis became increasingly unlikely. The Soviet decision makers were confronted with the challenge that some other solution had to be found. In a situation characterised by uncertainty and pressure, they had to guard the interests of Soviet security in general and of the Warsaw Pact in particular.

They had to choose among essentially three options:

1. Unified Germany might be persuaded to contribute to the Warsaw Pact in a degree that would ensure the Eastern alliance's viability.
2. In accordance with the declared principle of exclusively voluntary participation, the Warsaw Pact would seek to dispense with its German component. This would eliminate the intra-alliance and anti-Western aspects of threat inherent in Soviet military deployment in the GDR. In consequence of that,
 - united Germany would belong neither to NATO nor to the Pact, or
 - the USSR would acquiesce in an asymmetrical solution allowing for Germany to be a member of NATO (with or without restrictions on the inclusion of East Germany).

3. If the Warsaw Pact proved untenable under option 2, the Kremlin would have to accept a European configuration which would leave it without allies.

Theoretically, there was still another option: Germany's inclusion into the Warsaw Pact. But the Soviet leadership realised from the very beginning that it could not conceivably hope for such an outcome. Therefore, this possibility is not taken into account here.

The context of negotiating on Germany

After Gorbachev had acquiesced in German unification at the end of January 1990¹¹ he quickly accepted the procedural framework for international negotiations on the problem. On 10 February 1990 the CPSU General Secretary conceded to Chancellor Kohl that the Germans would be allowed to decide themselves on how they wanted to be united and within what time frame.¹² He did not object when his interlocutor expressed his willingness to seek 'unity as fast as possible'.¹³ This amounted to handing the key to German unity to the West German government, as one of Kohl's principal advisers has rightly pointed out.¹⁴ Gorbachev felt he could afford to renounce interference in internal matters of German unification. He confidently expected a protracted process to result which would leave the GDR intact for quite a while. Thus Soviet influence would be indirectly preserved, and the USSR would be under no time pressure. Underlying this view was the assessment that the social democrats were the prospective crucial political force in East Germany¹⁵. An additional reassurance seemed to be provided by the fact that all the groups represented at the GDR's Central Round Table were unwilling to abandon separate statehood.¹⁶

Gorbachev's expectation, however, was ill-founded. In the East German elections of 18 March 1990 Kohl's political ally, the christian democratic Alliance for Germany, prevailed. The social democrats emerged with less than half the votes. From then on, Kohl could go ahead putting his idea of fast and full German unity into practice. Moscow had relinquished its claim to control over the internal aspects of unification and thus could do nothing but passively observe the facts which Bonn was creating in agreement with the new government in East Berlin.

It was generally understood by the governments involved that the Germans could exercise national self-determination without foreign participation only as far as the domestic aspects of unification were concerned. International implications naturally required negotiations with other countries. The framework for this was agreed between the foreign ministers of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries at the 'Open Sky' Conference in Ottawa on 13 February 1990. Both the two German states and the four powers with responsibilities in Germany were to talk about the 'external aspects' of German unification. As was emphasised, the problem of the neighbouring states' security was to play a prominent role in this context.¹⁷ This procedural decision basically implied two things. The partners with whom the Germans had to reach agreement were restricted to the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. Other countries, such as Poland (which vainly sought to be included during the following months), had to voice their demands and grievances against Germany through the four powers. In addition to that, the two German states were listed first

in official terminology—a formality which indicated that it was primarily their interests that were to be taken into account.

Remarkably, the crucial decisions on procedure were reached very fast, almost in passing. Underlying this was a political rapprochement between the USSR and the West. Soviet and West German leaders had created a foundation of empathy and understanding when Kohl visited Moscow in autumn 1988 and Gorbachev came to Bonn in return in mid-1989. At the Malta summit Soviet relations with the United States had become very cooperative as well. In his talks with President Bush, Gorbachev had emphasised the need to develop common views on the ongoing political developments in Europe and to act upon them in mutual agreement. In this context, he assured Bush that he viewed US commitment to Europe favourably.¹⁸ A joint press conference was held, in which Gorbachev expressed himself very positively on American policies and formulated the principle of co-responsibility.¹⁹ After his return to Moscow, Gorbachev concluded that the Cold War had definitely come to an end and that understanding and cooperation with the United States was now on the agenda.²⁰ From then on the Soviet leader fully advocated a co-operative relationship with the Western countries and placed his stakes on corresponding policies. Economic expectations clearly played a role²¹ but Gorbachev's new design was much broader than that. In this context, consensus with the Western partners was clearly desirable. This explains why the Kremlin did not resume its previous tactics of stalling and bickering but allowed the negotiations on Germany to reach agreement without delay.

Moscow also refrained from two other practices to which it had habitually had recourse in the past. Differences between the West Germans and their East German partners were not exploited, despite the fact that the two sides had obvious difficulties in agreeing on some crucial points and that there was a feeling of being neglected in East Berlin. Also, the Soviet side did nothing to mobilise the German public against their country's NATO membership, even though there were pacifists and other circles who would have been willing to participate in such a campaign. One may argue, of course, that either activity had little chance of impressing the leaders in Bonn and other Western capitals in such a way as to make them change their basic attitude. But either ploy could have been expected to have a great nuisance value and to put pressure on the West. While the Soviet leaders had previously valued such pressure as a useful negotiation device, they did not want it now. The Kremlin was interested in completing its rapprochement with the West by an understanding on the German problem. For this reason it sought a solution which would be 'mutually acceptable', as was indicated from the start. This expressly applied also to the most difficult issue: German membership in NATO.

Interstate controversy over German NATO membership

During the period of East–West confrontation, Soviet statements had invariably portrayed NATO as an aggressive military bloc. West Germany's inclusion into NATO in 1955 was allegedly both a provocation against the USSR and a breach of Western war and postwar commitments. Political analysts had got used to the seemingly inescapable conclusion that Soviet acceptance of German unification could

not be bought at a price other than the country's withdrawal from the Western alliance. There were, in fact, corresponding inclinations within the Soviet body politic. When, in spring 1989, Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were warned by a foreign policy adviser that East German destabilisation was progressing rapidly and that hence the problem of German unification would impose itself, the recommendation was to plan for a pan-European security system which would be capable of integrating the prospective united Germany.²² When, early in 1990, the Soviet leaders accepted at last that German unification was inevitable, they expressed their preference for some settlement which would take Germany out of the military blocs. While a neutral status for the Central European country did not greatly appeal to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, other variants of a non-NATO arrangement were deemed desirable. According to this idea, practical details had to be worked out in the course of a dialogue with the Western negotiating partners.²³

What the Kremlin was essentially interested in was that the prospective united Germany should be excluded from NATO and not be allowed to turn into an independent military power as well. If Germany continued to be committed to the Western side, it was held, this would amount to an anti-Soviet shift in the correlation of forces.²⁴ This argument implied that, contrary to what Gorbachev had told Bush at the Malta summit, there was still a relationship of rivalry between the USSR and the Atlantic alliance. Nonetheless, Soviet representatives argued that past confrontation must not continue into the future and hence German unification was to be used as an opportunity for creating new pan-European security structures which would subsequently attract more countries. This in turn would serve as an element of East–West unity.²⁵ There was also an alternative Soviet suggestion. If West Germany would not leave the Western alliance, the GDR too would have to retain the political obligations and responsibilities which it had taken on, both in the Warsaw Treaty and in bilateral relations with the USSR. This idea was clearly opposed to the argument that bloc structures had to be overcome. The common denominator, however, was a quest for equity which was to be established by a symmetrical solution for the two sides.

For some while, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were cautious in arguing against German NATO membership. Their rejection was less than categorical.²⁶ They equally emphasised that the interests of the other side had to be taken into account and that a compromise would be appropriate.²⁷ It was only when the GDR's communist Minister President, Modrow, visited Moscow on 6 March 1990 that Gorbachev declared Germany's inclusion in NATO to be 'absolutely excluded'.²⁸ Subsequently, however, the Soviet leaders largely reverted to a more guarded expression of their resistance to the Western demand.

Undoubtedly, the responsible Soviet leaders had their reasons for not getting committed too strongly. The international configuration was highly unfavourable. The governments of both the three Western powers and the Federal Republic were adamant in demanding that Germany had to be a member of NATO. Otherwise, European security would be put in jeopardy. Seen from Washington, London and even Paris, the German contribution was indispensable for the continuation of the Western alliance. For its part, the West German establishment felt NATO to be both a crucial source of political support and a necessary reassurance for the European neighbours who otherwise would be frightened by the prospect of a greater Germany.

Accordingly, the USSR was confronted with partners who were absolutely determined to insist on their view. If they did not get what they wanted, the two-plus-four negotiations were likely to fail.

The Soviet leaders received no political support from the other Warsaw Pact governments. When the foreign ministers of the Eastern alliance met in Prague on 17 March 1990, it was only Shevardnadze who felt that Germany had to be outside NATO. The East German delegation was incapable of taking a position since its communist government was sure to be voted out on the following day. The representatives of the three Balkan countries were careful not to commit themselves in any way, while the ministers of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary openly advocated German NATO membership. For them, Germany's inclusion in the Western alliance was the only possible institutional guarantee to control the risk of future German nationalism and the uncertainty it might generate. NATO rather than some ill-defined pan-European framework was seen to be capable of coping with whatever challenge might arise in Germany.²⁹

The Soviet position was further weakened by the Kremlin's own doubt whether it was wise for the USSR to press for a non-NATO solution at the price of estranging the Western partners. The co-operative relationship sought by Moscow might be put in jeopardy if the Soviet negotiators insisted too harshly on Germany's not being allowed to remain in the Western alliance. The USSR's anti-NATO interest had to be weighed against the country's interest in friendship with the West. As it appears, there was also an increasing awareness that the Soviet Union would have to depend heavily on Western, and notably West German, support and aid if the critical stages of *perestroika* were to be overcome. Last but not least, there was the problem of what the Kremlin would do if the negotiations failed and the GDR was left without West German assistance. East Germany was rapidly becoming unstable, and the Gorbachev leadership saw no alternative but permitting the country to merge with the Federal Republic. Under these conditions the possibility that the two-plus-four negotiations might fail was a source of serious concern: then either the West Germans would proceed without an agreement, or the GDR would be left to chaos and anarchy. Neither option was acceptable. The strength of this feeling in Moscow can be seen from the warm approval which Shevardnadze gave to Bonn's plan for a quick economic and currency union with the GDR as early as mid-February 1990.³⁰

Soviet search for alternatives to German NATO membership

When the two-plus-four negotiations started, the Soviet leaders were still sufficiently hopeful that German unification could be kept outside NATO. A crucial point of this confidence was the expectation that the unification process would take its time and thus be sufficiently long to allow agreement to be reached with no time pressure whatsoever. So it appeared largely irrelevant that the Kremlin had no clear idea of the future security order in Europe and Germany's role in it. The Soviet leaders declared themselves open to a number of suggestions and options, depending on what might prove acceptable to the partners in the West. They were willing to discuss various international structures for Germany's integration such as, in particular, some kind of collective security system, an institutionalised CSCE, a non-military role in NATO,

or German obligations toward both military alliances. Even the idea of having Germany in a new NATO which would accept the Soviet Union as well was broached.³¹

The proposals of either collective security or restricted German NATO membership (by analogy with France's role in NATO) were voiced as trial balloons time and again during the period from March to June 1990. Another line of thought, however, was pursued more persistently: Germany was to participate in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and thus to provide a link between the two alliances which would make them gradually merge into one European security system. The idea, which Shevardnadze offered as early as in Ottawa when the decision was made on the two-plus-four negotiations,³² invariably elicited negative response among the Western partners. Moscow persistently put it on the agenda for more than three months,³³ but failed in its effort to make it attractive. In the Western view the idea was both unacceptable and impractical: it could not but deprive NATO of its German backbone and place incompatible obligations on the Germans. Whenever the two alliances were at variance, Germany would have to follow mutually exclusive directions. Equally rejected was the concomitant idea, launched by the Soviet side, of committing Germany to allow both Western and Soviet troops to stay as allies on its soil. The Soviet diplomats reacted by proposing instead a demilitarised corridor through Germany as a means to separate the forces of either side. Soviet assurances that the problems of dual membership could be handled easily as they would be only an interim stage and would result in joint structures of the two alliances³⁴ did not elicit Western sympathy either.

From the very beginning, the Western negotiators tried to make German NATO membership acceptable to their Soviet partners by suggesting reservations concerning East Germany's inclusion. The West German government took the initiative by saying that the new Federal lands might remain 'outside NATO's jurisdiction'.³⁵ There was a controversy between the Foreign Minister, Genscher, and the Defence Minister, Stoltenberg, on the extent of the restrictions to be included. The latter opposed Genscher's idea that Eastern Germany should not be covered by German defence forces.³⁶ Kohl took the position that the German soldiers who would be deployed in the GDR might not be assigned to NATO.³⁷ This concession was not deemed unproblematical in Bonn. It was felt to be indispensable that NATO's security guarantee had to cover all of Germany, but the alliance's defence system would be excluded from the country's Eastern part, at least in peacetime. However, this difficulty appeared minor in comparison with what would be gained if the USSR were persuaded to accept German NATO membership. To contain the risks, Kohl insisted on the Bundeswehr being deployed in the Eastern provinces from the very beginning and on having all restrictions lifted after an interim period. It was on this basis that the Western side reached consensus.³⁸ Not surprisingly, these qualifications were not seen as satisfactory in Moscow. The Kremlin rejected them as insufficient.³⁹

There were, however, early signs that the Soviet leadership was unlikely to be adamant in resisting Western demands. The USSR's stand was characterised by a plethora of varying statements which seem to reflect differences both among policy makers and over time. For example, a 'non-paper' handed by Ambassador Kochemasov to the East German government on 16 April 1990 was sharper in tone and

contents than the statements made by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in Bonn.⁴⁰ On several occasions, Soviet representatives justified their statements by saying that they had to take into account the domestic situation in their country.⁴¹ This could possibly be understood to mean that they would like to be more conciliatory.

Strangely enough, there is even some information indicating that the Soviet leaders' opposition to Germany's role in NATO might have been more apparent than real at a very early date. As Bonn learned from both Polish and Hungarian sources, Shevardnadze privately expressed his gratitude to the three foreign ministers of the East Central European countries for not backing him when he stated his opposition to German NATO membership at the Prague Warsaw Pact session on 17 March 1990.⁴² Did this imply that the top foreign policy maker in Moscow felt that the allies' defiance was helpful rather than detrimental, since it could be used to persuade domestic opponents that German NATO membership was inevitable? While such an assumption seems implausible, it is difficult to find another explanation.

At an early stage of the negotiations, Soviet leaders and diplomats began to define general criteria which could be and eventually were used to justify crucial concessions on the NATO issue. The arrangement envisaged was to make sure that war would not originate from Germany once again.⁴³ Another yardstick which could be applied to both hardline and compliant solutions was the demand that Germany and/or NATO must not take an anti-Soviet direction.⁴⁴

Related policy issues

The foreign policy makers of both the USSR and the West agreed from the very beginning that the crucial issues, particularly Germany's military status, would only be settled in a package deal which would provide compensation for the concessions to be made by one side or the other. One of the points which was emphasised by the Kremlin was the necessity of a lowered ceiling for Germany's military forces as a crucial element of the agreement to be reached.⁴⁵ In June 1990 Shevardnadze suggested that the current German troop level of approximately 700 000 men in the two armies should be reduced to 200 000–250 000 soldiers when Germany was united.⁴⁶ The need for a military reduction commitment was recognised in Bonn and in other Western capitals as a point of departure, and a ceiling of 380 000–420 000 men was contemplated. There was also a feeling that the German troop numbers had to be fixed in the context of the talks on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) rather than in an isolated fashion.⁴⁷

Another demand which was seen as equally important in Moscow was denuclearisation of Germany. Particularly when it became increasingly clear that the Soviet military forces and hence also the Soviet nuclear systems would leave Central Europe in the years to come, it appeared equitable to the Kremlin that the West should reciprocate. The Federal Republic had already renounced atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) weapons and was likely to repeat this commitment, but it could not be taken for granted that the Western nuclear arsenals in Germany would be eliminated as well. It is for this reason that the Soviet negotiators pressed for this to be included in the agreement.⁴⁸ It was understood on the Western side that something had to be done to meet Soviet needs. It was helpful that, in early May 1990,

President Bush decided to discontinue Lance modernisation, which had been the focus of intense controversy with the USSR in 1988–89. But other nuclear systems would have to be addressed too.

One of the basic Soviet tenets was that East–West confrontation had to be overcome and that therefore NATO had to change in character. The two alliances were to develop cooperative structures to provide for common security. This presupposed that NATO would revise old doctrines and strategies alongside the Warsaw Pact. The Kremlin was hopeful but less than confident that NATO would indeed change.⁴⁹ The Soviet leadership indicated on occasion that NATO reform might have an impact on how Germany's participation in the alliance would be assessed in Moscow.⁵⁰

From the very start of the two-plus-four negotiations, the West German government and its allies began to think about how Soviet desire for NATO reform could be satisfied, so as to facilitate agreement on the principal issue of German membership of the alliance. The discussions resulted in the 'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance' of 6 July 1990.⁵¹ The crucial message was that 'the Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship'.

In practical detail, NATO undertook to reduce and restructure its military forces, to scale back the readiness of its active units, to eliminate all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe, and generally to decrease its reliance on nuclear weapons. A joint NATO and Warsaw Pact declaration on termination of the previous enmity relationship, on renunciation of threat or use of force against one another, and mutual obligation to refrain from aggression was solemnly suggested. In an effort 'to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance', Gorbachev and the leaders of the other Warsaw Pact countries were invited to address the NATO Council and to establish regular diplomatic liaison. Equally, Moscow's invitation to the NATO Secretary General was accepted. At the military level, the Eastern side was invited to intensify contact and dialogue, and the Western alliance envisaged a basic rethinking of defence. These commitments and promises evoked a highly positive response among the Soviet leaders.⁵²

Kohl took another initiative to establish a mutual relationship which would allow the controversial points to be settled. Underlying it was an early realisation that firm and durable cooperation was a primary Soviet goal for both political and economic reasons.⁵³ It was on this basis that Kohl's adviser, Teltschik, suggested that a German–Soviet treaty should be proposed to Moscow as an instrument to provide for a stable new relationship which would do away with past antagonism and guarantee good relations. Kohl understood at once that such a treaty might be crucial in settling fundamental issues. When the treaty project was suggested to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, their response was highly positive. Such a contractual agreement was indeed the thing which the Soviet leaders were seeking.⁵⁴

From the very beginning, the issues both of Soviet troop withdrawal and termination of four-power responsibility were related to the issue of Germany's military status. These problems will not be discussed here in any detail.⁵⁵ It suffices to say that the Kremlin originally wanted to extend both its troop presence and its post-1945 status for some time to come, or at least retain the possibility of restoring either

channel of influence, thereby indicating that it was necessary to ensure political development in Germany which was favourable for the USSR.⁵⁶ The controversy over these points was protracted, with the Soviet side modifying the presentation of its position. A linkage was established between the presence of Western and Soviet forces: the Soviet troops would withdraw only if Western soldiers were evacuated from Germany as well.⁵⁷

Moscow's demand for a transitional period before united Germany would be granted full sovereignty also took the form of expressed willingness to allow separation of domestic and foreign aspects of unification in the interests of getting the stalled negotiations out of their impasse. As Shevardnadze suggested at the Bonn session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 5 May 1990, Germany might unite prior to agreement on international conditions, negotiation on which would then proceed without haste or negative impact on German domestic affairs. This was seemingly an offer to allow intractable international problems such as, in particular, German NATO membership not to hinder unification. In fact, however, the implication was that Moscow would have been given the possibility to deny sovereignty to Germany for an indefinite period of time. Also, the USSR would have been relieved of the mounting pressure to accept German participation in NATO.⁵⁸

The proposal was subsequently modified so as to suggest that no more than simply postponement of German sovereignty until some time after unification was sought. To support the demand, the argument was used that East Germany's treaty obligations, particularly *vis-à-vis* the Warsaw Pact, had to be adopted by Germany for some while until substitutes had been worked out.⁵⁹ In other contexts the Soviet representatives also pressed for a reassurance that the united Germany was to honour the GDR's political obligations.⁶⁰ This was no mere pretence: as can be seen from Gorbachev's exchange with Kohl on 15 July 1990, there was some serious concern that, in particular, the Soviet stationing of troops in East Germany might be deprived of any legal basis from one day to the next.⁶¹ For this reason, German willingness to unite on the basis of the GDR's accession to the Federal Republic on the basis of article 23 of the West German Basic Law was initially rejected as well.⁶² All these arguments were designed with a view to not allowing German NATO membership to be pressed against Moscow's wishes. All these proposals were rejected in Bonn and in the other Western capitals. Thus Gorbachev and Shevardnadze could not avoid being confronted with what was the crucial Western demand: Soviet acceptance of German NATO membership.

The impact of domestic politics

While external factors pushed the Soviet foreign policy makers towards concession, the domestic situation of the USSR tended to develop in the opposite direction. Decommunisation and emancipation of what had been Moscow's 'outer empire' had elicited resentment and fury among both communists and imperially minded soldiers and intellectuals. In December 1989 a vocal opposition against the allegedly capitulationist policies of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze began to emerge. The two leaders and their advisers were blamed for abandoning the achievements of World War II and for jeopardising the foundations of Soviet security. This feeling of opposition was

strongly voiced in the CPSU Central Committee plenum in February 1990, when vehement attacks were directed against what was portrayed as a betrayal of the country's most vital interests.⁶³ There was acute dissatisfaction in the *apparat*. Even such a highly placed official person as one of the deputy ministers of defence, General Moiseiev, did not shy away from discrediting the official line. He publicly stated that the danger of war with the West continued to exist.⁶⁴ The head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, Falin, strongly criticised the German unification process as it was developing in agreement with the USSR.⁶⁵ One of Shevardnadze's deputies in the Foreign Ministry spoke out against official policies and warned that Germany must not be allowed to be a member of NATO.⁶⁶ The more moderate military raised their voices against any concessions concerning Germany's military status.⁶⁷ It has been reported that some military leaders even demonstrated to Gorbachev in February that they would not allow more concessions to the Germans and the West. If their views were ignored, they would resort to armed resistance.⁶⁸

During spring 1990 opposition stiffened. In June full-fledged antagonists of Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's policies created a party organisation of their own, the Communist Party of Russia. At approximately the same time there was a sharp debate in the CPSU Central Committee. Falin strongly attacked official policies towards Germany. In particular, he objected that the GDR was being 'devoured' by West Germany and that the Federal Republic's claim to be the foundation of the future united Germany had been accepted. He also emphasised that the Warsaw Pact had to be maintained through reform and to serve as a basis of the emerging new Europe. As to the military status of Germany, he deemed indispensable a balance of interests which would not allow Soviet rights to be secondary to Western ones, as he felt was being accepted by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Against these and other accusations, official policies were defended by the Director of the Academy of Sciences European Institute, Zhurkin.⁶⁹ In the end, Gorbachev managed to turn the tide. His policy line prevailed at the XXVIII Congress on 2–13 July 1990.⁷⁰ As both the Soviet leaders and their Western partners were aware, it was this political victory at home which allowed the Kremlin leeway in German affairs.⁷¹

This success was, *inter alia*, due to support by domestic allies. To be sure, the advocates of the old order were very influential in the bureaucracy and among the military. But there were increasingly large segments of society which sought change in foreign relations. They wanted a new relationship with the formerly captive allies, with Germany, and with the Western powers. Long before decommunisation had begun in 1989, they had already protested against old thinking in foreign policy by stating that it was Stalin's ruthlessness which had made the Western nations draw together in NATO and combat what they could not but view as the USSR's challenge. According to this thesis, it was Soviet traditional policy rather than Western attitudes which had to change if East–West confrontation was to be overcome. In an early phase, the conclusion had been that the two blocs had to be replaced by some pan-European security system.

During the upheaval of autumn 1989 this reformist school of thought parted ways. While the centrists stuck to pan-Europeanism, which they saw as an instrument of both rapprochement with the West and control over Germany, the democrats' demand for change went beyond previous revisionism. According to their argument, a

pan-European security system was not realistic any longer since the West simply would not accept it. At the same time, there were doubts whether such a system would really work. If this system were inefficient, as appeared likely given the short time available, German neutralism would result. This would be tantamount to creating the same conditions as after the 1919 Peace Treaty of Versailles, which had allowed the European countries to eschew consensus and take the road of World War II. Since the Warsaw Pact was in disarray and decay, NATO was the only reliable security framework in Europe. Thus the Western alliance was indispensable for the stability in Europe on which the USSR depended if it wanted to be successful in transforming itself domestically. The Soviet democrats were also convinced that there was a common basis of political values between the countries of NATO and democratising Russia.⁷²

The democratic view was more radical in accepting Western positions than the centrist-minded Soviet leadership felt it could accept. But in the course of spring 1990 a common denominator between the two sides developed. When Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had acquiesced in German unification at the end of January, they had been conceptually unprepared for the international problems which went along with it. So they had not objected to German neutrality being suggested by others (such as the East German communist leader Modrow or interviewing Soviet journalists) for a short while.⁷³ When the foreign policy makers in Moscow thought more deeply about this proposal, however, they came to the conclusion that a freelancing Germany would bring back the risks of the interwar period. It was therefore clearly undesirable.⁷⁴ Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were unwilling to buy the democrats' argument that the USSR should accept NATO as a stabilising element in Europe. They continued to advocate a solution which would integrate Germany in some kind of joint East–West security framework. But the Western countries, including the Federal Republic, were definitely unwilling to accept such an arrangement. So the democrats' argument became attractive at least as a rationale which might help to justify the concession to NATO if it became inescapable.

Agreement on German NATO membership

Observers both in Western countries and in the USSR increasingly realised that the Soviet leaders would be unable in the end to continue their resistance against Germany's inclusion in NATO. By early March 1990 some reformers and democrats in Moscow with contact with top foreign policy makers had predicted that Gorbachev would eventually acquiesce in the Western demand. Two months later quite a few of Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's negotiating partners expected that the Kremlin would eventually give in. The most likely date was thought to be a short while before the consummation of German unification in the autumn, once the Soviet leadership had gained the upper hand at the XXVIII Congress. The possibility for Soviet compliance had been created in early July 1990, it is true, but it was felt that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze would wait as long as possible so as to maximise Western counter-concessions. An important element of the diplomatic bargain resulted from Gorbachev's ever-increasing economic difficulties and his hopes for Western financial assistance. Both the G-7 forum of the world's leading industrial

nations and the West German Chancellor had already indicated their willingness to help, if on a general basis.

It came as a surprise to Western governments that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze did not wait until the autumn but sought agreement when Kohl visited the USSR in mid-July. This was a departure from previous Soviet habits. It was equally unusual that there was no intense bargaining over the price to be paid by the Western side. On the basis of political and financial offers submitted by the Western governments in general and by Bonn in particular, Gorbachev accepted German NATO membership without much reservation.⁷⁵ He clearly was seeking a co-operative relationship which would be based on mutual trust and understanding.

The crucial points were agreed between Gorbachev and Kohl in Moscow on 15 July 1990. The Soviet leader was willing to accept termination of four-power responsibilities and full German sovereignty at the moment when the Federal Republic and the GDR merged. This would imply German self-determination on alliance participation. At the Chancellor's request, he confirmed that the Germans were free to continue their membership of NATO. As Gorbachev emphasised, German renunciation of ABC weapons, non-extension of NATO structures on GDR territory for the time being, a lower manpower ceiling on the West German army and a contractual agreement on a continuing, if diminishing Soviet troop presence in East Germany for a few years were other essentials of the deal.⁷⁶ Underlying it was German willingness both to give several billion DM credit to the USSR and to assist the forces' withdrawal through payment which was later put at DM 15 billion. These financial means would be used to provide housing for soldiers who returned to their home country. The agreement was disclosed to the public one day later at a joint press conference of the two leaders in Zheleznovodsk. The crucial points were clearly and unambiguously stated, with Gorbachev emphasising the fundamental character of the change which had begun to take place in NATO.⁷⁷

On the whole, the results were favourable for the West. The Federal Republic and the three Western powers had prevailed on the crucial issue of German NATO membership, which allowed the Western alliance to become the cornerstone of European security rather than being put in jeopardy, whereas the Warsaw Pact was doomed, as was soon to become clear. At the same time, the details of the accompanying concessions to the USSR were such as to imply no unacceptable sacrifice. To be sure, the 370 000 men ceiling imposed on Germany's military forces was fixed outside the CFE context and thus amounted to an individual unilateral obligation—something which Bonn had traditionally sought to avoid. But the personnel figure conceded to the German side was closer to Bonn's than to Moscow's point of departure. It did imply that the two German armies had to be cut in half, but this was felt to be feasible given the de-confrontation in Europe which had taken place.

German renunciation of ABC armament simply repeated an individual commitment undertaken by the Federal Republic as early as the 1950s. Everyone knew from the very beginning that Germany's neighbours in both East and West would insist that this restriction must continue. The point of contention had been only the Soviet demand that the Western powers' nuclear systems be evacuated from West German territory. NATO, it is true, was obliged to reduce the numbers of these systems, but total elimination was not agreed. The Western side had also prevailed over the issue

of getting the Soviet troops out, while no such provision was made for the Western troops which were deployed in the Federal Republic with the free will of the host country. Last but not least, Gorbachev had agreed to German sovereignty, and with no delay after unification was consummated. What the Soviet Union was to receive in return was both Western, particularly West German, willingness to cooperate and German commitments to help the ailing Soviet economy financially.

German unification and European security

It was a most unusual, indeed unique historical situation, which falsified all concepts and predictions on how German unification would come about and how it would relate to European security. But it can be argued that a less anomalous configuration is unlikely to have resulted in German unification at all. Under conditions of 'normal' international relations, along the lines established in the preceding decades, there was little if any possibility that the *status quo* of German division would be altered. Bahr and other fundamentalist advocates of détente were right in feeling that, on the premise that there would be no breach of past patterns, German unification would hardly evolve. He was wrong, however, in anticipating that normal East–West development would allow confrontation to subside at some point. Hence his vision that the two sides would create common security structures did not come true. The termination of East–West conflict presupposed that the USSR had lost much of its political weight.

The communist system and East–West confrontation had been twins in Europe and in Germany. When both of them collapsed, it was German unity which emerged first, owing to elemental feeling, particularly in the eastern part of Germany. There was no similar drive which would have propelled progress towards a joint system of European security as well. On the contrary, decommunisation entailed the re-emergence of divisive national feeling which had been suppressed in the Soviet power sphere. It is logical that this new challenge to security in Europe did not promote a common effort. Against this background, it was only logical that the West's stable security structure, NATO, was confirmed rather than demolished (as would have been the case if the German backbone had been taken out of the alliance). There was some awareness in Moscow that German NATO membership was also in the best Soviet interest. After all, the Western alliance was stemming a tide of destabilisation which was threatening *perestroika*. Political transformation in the USSR presupposed a stable international environment.

The Atlantic alliance, however, was largely unprepared to play the role of a stabiliser outside its territory. But one of its basic assets, the peace zone created among its previously often conflicting members, was an indispensable component of any arrangement on European security. The Soviet foreign policy makers were increasingly aware that, given the strains of the ongoing domestic transformation process, it was such stability that they needed in the outside world. They concluded that NATO had to serve as a partial guarantor of their country's external security. This presupposed that Moscow had abandoned its previous ambitions to control much of the global development and now contented itself with guarding regional and defensive security interests. It is on this basis that, in the course of 1991, the interests

of the USSR on the one hand and those of the NATO countries, including the United States, on the other were seen in Moscow to coincide.⁷⁸

The international configuration which permitted German unification came as a surprise to everyone. Quite a few advocates of *détente* had felt that German division would last forever. Those who had continued to look forward towards unity had expected only slow and gradual progress. Under those conditions, it appeared natural that the other European countries could be both willing and able to provide the security framework which would make German unification safe for the rest of the continent. From autumn 1989 to autumn 1990, however, an accelerating dynamism towards unification emerged which did not allow the time to lay new foundations for European security. Innovative solutions which would still have to be tested were out of the question. The governments involved had to have recourse to what security structures were in existence already. In the perspective of both West Germany and the three Western powers, NATO was the only reliable security structure in Europe. Continuing German participation in NATO was therefore deemed indispensable. The Kremlin was neither strong nor persuasive enough when it sought an arrangement which would prolong East German membership in the fledgeling Warsaw Pact. In essence, the Soviet foreign policy makers themselves felt that they had no convincing alternative. They did not really deny Germany access to NATO, and they never put their full weight behind a clear-cut proposal of their own. Their objective was rather to seek some kind of middle-of-the-road arrangement which would limit or delay Western gains.

A number of factors contributed to countering Soviet damage-limitation tactics. The GDR's progressive destabilisation, Soviet unwillingness and inability to make a stabilising effort in East Germany, and the Warsaw Pact members' radical rejection of previous bonds with the USSR are among the most important ones. Under these conditions, Moscow could not stick to its preferred option. As a result, insistence on both a pan-European security system or on some compromise to provide for some German participation in the Eastern alliance proved unfeasible. This in turn was a deadly blow to the Warsaw Pact as a whole. The USSR was thus unable to use the two-plus-four agreement it envisaged as an instrument for keeping unwilling allies in some modified version of the Eastern alliance.

When the Soviet leaders realised that they had to dispense with the German component in the Warsaw Pact, they faced a difficult choice. On the one hand, they could try to press for Germany not to belong to either alliance. Pursuit of such an objective would have reflected the Kremlin's desire for an equitable solution which would not favour the Western side at Soviet expense. But there were strong arguments against making such an effort. The USSR would have had to pay a high price in terms of alienating the West. At the same time, the chances of success were very low from the start, given the West's unconditional rejection of any deal which would leave NATO without West Germany.

If, however, the Kremlin was willing to acquiesce in German NATO participation with some minor qualifications, substantial benefit could be expected in terms of Western, notably West German, preparedness to provide help to Moscow. It is true that such a choice was tantamount to acceptance of an asymmetrical outcome in traditional terms. But this promised satisfaction of the most pressing Soviet need:

economic support would be forthcoming. Western benevolence also opened a way out of the security dilemmas which the Soviet leaders had to face after their traditional allies had increasingly defied and isolated them. This was the basic reason why Bonn and the other Western governments did not encounter much difficulty in persuading their Soviet counterparts that trading Germany's military status for good relations with NATO and the Western countries was a good bargain. Thus a fundamentally new security situation emerged in Europe under the catalytic effect of German unification. As a result, both influence and responsibility have been handed to the West and to its leading power, the United States.

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¹ In spring 1949 Kennan made the Planning Staff of the US State Department prepare two options on the German problem, one of which envisaged Germany being reunified under four-power control (see in more detail Gerhard Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland* (Munich, Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967), pp. 252–255). In 1957 Kennan advocated in one of his BBC Reith Lectures German reunification and East–West military disengagement in Central Europe (George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West*. The BBC Reith Lectures 1957 (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 33–50).

² The target of criticism was Adenauer's policy of West Germany's Western integration which allegedly had sacrificed national unity. The culmination points of the controversy were Paul Sethe's book *Zwischen Bonn und Moskau* (Frankfurt/Main, Scheffer Verlag, 1956), and the verbal attacks by Gustav Heinemann and Thomas Dehler in the Bundestag session of 23 January 1958. The author's recent research on the problem in the archive of the Russian foreign ministry has established that Stalin and his aides did not intend to weaken, let alone sacrifice, the communist regime in the GDR for the sake of German unification and neutralisation. The study will be published in *The Historical Journal* (Cambridge).

³ For an overview see Fred Oldenburg, 'Die Deutschlandpolitik Gorbatschows 1985–1991', *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Berichte des BIOst*, hereafter), 17, 1992; Gerhard Wettig, 'Basic Concepts of Gorbachev's New Security Thinking', in Jyrki Iivonen, ed., *The Changing Soviet Union in the New Europe* (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1991), pp. 85–109; Gerhard Wettig, 'Die sowjetische Rolle beim Umsturz in der DDR und bei der Einleitung des deutschen Einigungsprozesses', in Juergen Elvert & Michael Salewski, eds, *Der Umbruch in Osteuropa* (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993), pp. 39–63. The present study is based on information both written (as contained in the notes) and oral (from Moscow, East Berlin and Bonn).

⁴ See, *inter alia*, Fred Oldenburg, 'Die Implosion des SED-Regimes,' *Berichte des BIOst*, 10, 1991.

⁵ For the relevant details see Gerhard Wettig, 'The Kremlin's Impact on the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany (August 1989–March 1990)', in Odd Arne Westad & Iver Neumann, eds, *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1945–1989* (London, Macmillan, forthcoming in 1993).

⁶ Cf. X [George F. Kennan], 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', *Foreign Affairs*, 25, 4, July 1947, pp. 566–582.

⁷ Bahr statement in Tutzing on 15 July 1963, in Boris Meissner, ed., *Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961–1970. Dokumentation* (Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 45–48.

⁸ Notes taken immediately after an interview with Bahr on 9 January 1969, in Walter F. Hahn, 'Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr', *Orbis*, XVI, 4, Winter 1973, pp. 867–871.

⁹ 'Vostochnaya Evropa na puti k obnoveniyu', *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 1, 1990, pp. 115–118; A. Bogatyrov, M. Nosov & K. Pleshakov, 'Kto oni, nashi soyuzniki?', *Kommunist*, 1, 1990, pp. 105–114. A similar view was expressed by Gorbachev himself during his Malta summit meeting with President Bush, as can be seen from an extract of the Soviet minutes (Michail S. Gorbatschow, *Gipfelgespräche. Geheime Protokolle aus meiner Amtszeit* (Berlin, Rowohlt, 1993), pp. 122–123).

¹⁰ The idea both to liberalise and 'Finlandise' the Warsaw Pact has been viewed as a premeditated Gorbachev concept and traced back to Andropov and his allegedly having been impressed with the positive character of the USSR's relationship with Finland: less binding but voluntary and beneficial in matters of both security and economy (Philipp A. Petersen, 'The Emerging Soviet Vision of European Security', working paper, draft, 10 April 1990). While Gorbachev's long-standing association with Andropov and his premeditated willingness to change old habits

generally can be demonstrated, the sequence of the CPSU General Secretary's statements and actions on specific issues of intrasocialist policy strongly suggests that conceptualisation followed situation, not *vice versa*. In his policies toward Germany, Gorbachev can be seen with particular clarity as a politician who is reacting to events he has neither wanted nor anticipated.

¹¹ See the official statement on the Gorbachev–Modrow talk of 30 January 1990: 'Druzheskaya vstrecha', *Pravda*, 31 January 1990.

¹² 'Vstrecha M. S. Gorbacheva i G. Kolya', *Izvestiya*, 11 February 1990.

¹³ Statement of Chancellor Kohl in the Bundestag on 15 February 1990 as published in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 26, 1990, 16 February 1990, p. 202.

¹⁴ Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin, Siedler, 1991), pp. 156–157.

¹⁵ Cf., *inter alia*, Shevardnadze in an interview with M. Yusin, *Izvestiya*, 19 February 1990; Hans Modrow, *Aufbruch und Ende* (Hamburg, Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1991) (2nd ed.), pp. 105, 121; Eduard Schewardnadze, *Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1991), p. 243.

¹⁶ Uwe Thaysen, *Der Runde Tisch oder: Wo blieb das Volk? Der Weg der DDR in die Demokratie* (Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), pp. 142–149.

¹⁷ Text of the Ottawa communiqué: *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ed. by the Federal Ministry for Intra-German Affairs, series III, Vol. 8a (1990) (Bonn, Deutscher Bundesverlag, 1991), p. 103.

¹⁸ Extract from the Soviet minutes of the Gorbachev–Bush talks near Malta, in Gorbatschow, *Gipfelgespräche . . .*, pp. 121–125.

¹⁹ Text: *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior*, Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues, ed. by Committee on Foreign Affairs, prep. by Congressional Research Service (Joseph G. Whelan), Vol. III: 1988–90 (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, April 1991), pp. 246–247. Cf. Shevardnadze's statement in an interview with M. Yusin after the Ottawa Conference that the Soviet leadership did not regard the United States as an enemy any longer, *Izvestiya*, 19 February 1990.

²⁰ *Soviet Diplomacy . . .*, pp. 257–263.

²¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 260–261.

²² Memorandum by V. Dashichev of 18 April 1989 as published in German translation in *Der Spiegel*, 6, 1990, pp. 142–158. The paragraphs most critical of the GDR's situation have been left out. The memorandum was forwarded, *inter alia*, to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev who, however, did not respond to the warning it contained.

²³ Modrow, *Aufbruch . . .*, pp. 123–124; Shevardnadze, during a press conference in Moscow on 10 February 1990, *Izvestiya*, 11 February 1990; Gorbachev, in an interview with a *Pravda* correspondent, *Pravda*, 21 February 1990.

²⁴ TASS (in Russian) on Shevardnadze's remark in a conversation with Polish Ambassador Ciosek, 23 February 1990; translated version in *Ostinformationen*, ed. by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, 27 February 1990, pp. 1–2; statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 24 February 1990, as carried by TASS (in Russian), 24 February 1990, translated version in *ibid.*, pp. 3–4; Gorbachev, during a press conference in Moscow on 15 March 1990. *Pravda*, 17 March 1990; Teltschik, *329 Tage . . .*, pp. 155, 163.

²⁵ For a detailed elaboration of this view see Shevardnadze's statement at the Berlin session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 22 June 1990, in *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR*, 14, 1990, p. 17.

²⁶ See, *inter alia*, interview given by Shevardnadze to M. Yusin during the flight back from Ottawa, *Izvestiya*, 19 February 1990; Teltschik, *329 Tage . . .*, pp. 153, 155.

²⁷ See, for example, Shevardnadze, during a press conference in Moscow on 10 February 1990. *Izvestiya*, 11 February 1990.

²⁸ *Pravda*, 7 March 1990.

²⁹ Michael Evans, 'Moscow Isolated Within Pact', *The Times*, 19 March 1990; Celestine Bohlen, 'Warsaw Pact Fails to Agree on German Neutrality', *International Herald Tribune*, 19 March 1990; Teltschik, *329 Tage . . .* p. 187; Ulrich Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung der DDR: Die '2 + 4 - Verhandlungen'. Ein Insiderbericht* (Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992), pp. 59–60.

³⁰ Interview given by Shevardnadze to M. Yusin during the flight back from Ottawa. *Izvestiya*, 19 February 1990.

³¹ These different options were occasionally offered not one after another but at the same time; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 186–187.

³² Gerald R. Kleinfeld, 'Die Verwirklichung des Unwahrscheinlichen. Amerikanische Aussenpolitik und deutsche Wiedervereinigung', in Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich, ed., *Die USA und die deutsche Frage 1945–1990* (Frankfurt/Main and New York, Campus Verlag, 1991), p. 382.

³³ See, *inter alia*, Shevardnadze, at a press conference in Moscow on 10 February 1990.

Izvestiya, 11 February 1990; E. Shevardnadze, 'Towards a Greater Europe. The Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO in a Renewing Europe', in *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 35, 3, June 1990, pp. 18–22 (available as a manuscript to Western governments in the first half of April 1990); Soviet government statement handed as a non-paper to the East German government on 16 April 1990, in *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik* . . . , p. 164; interview with E. Shevardnadze, *Irish Times*, 28 April 1990; statement by E. Shevardnadze during the Bonn session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 5 May 1990. *Izvestiya*, 6 May 1990; Gorbachev, in an interview for the US journal *Time* as published in *Pravda*, 28 May 1990; statement by E. Shevardnadze during the Berlin session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 22 June 1990, in *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, 14, 1990, p. 19; Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 151, 180, 186, 194, 207, 269–270, 277; Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung* . . . , pp. 61–63, 77; 'Basic Principles of a Peace Regulation with Germany', submitted at the two-plus-four ministerial meeting in Berlin on 22 June 1990, in Julij A. Kwizinskij, *Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten* (Berlin, Siedler, 1993), pp. 41–46.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78; Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 186, 247–248. The implied need for bloc-transcending structures was frequently and insistently voiced by the Kremlin; cf., *inter alia*, E. Shevardnadze, in an interview given to M. Yusin, *Izvestiya*, 19 February 1990; Gorbachev's answers to questions put by a *Pravda* correspondent, *Pravda*, 21 February 1990; statement by Gorbachev during a press conference in Moscow on 15 March 1990. *Pravda*, 17 March 1990; N. Portugalov, in an interview published in *Die Welt*, 21 May 1990; Gorbachev, in an interview for the US journal *Time* as published in *Pravda*, 28 May 1990.

³⁵ Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 148–149.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 149–152.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 152, 162.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 190, 242, 263.

³⁹ Shevardnadze, in a conversation with Polish Ambassador Ciosek in Moscow on 23 February 1990, as reported by TASS (in Russian), 23 February 1990, translated into German in *Ostinformationen*, ed. by the Federal Press and Information Office, 27 February 1990, p. 2; N. Portugalov, in an interview published in *Die Welt*, 21 May 1990; Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . p. 163.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198. For the text of the 'non-paper' see *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik* . . . , pp. 161–166.

⁴¹ Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 180, 222.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 184, 201.

⁴³ See, *inter alia*, Gorbachev, during a press conference in Moscow on 15 March 1990. *Pravda*, 17 March 1990; Gorbachev's speech commemorating the 45th anniversary of victory in World War II on 8 March 1990. *Pravda*, 9 May 1990; statement by E. Shevardnadze during the Berlin session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 22 June 1990, *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, 14, 1990, p. 18; Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 170, 186, 206–207.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 185–186.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁴⁶ Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung* . . . , p. 76; 'Basic Principles . . .', p. 42.

⁴⁷ Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 148, 172, 258.

⁴⁸ Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung* . . . , p. 76.

⁴⁹ Shevardnadze, in an interview with M. Yusin. *Izvestiya*, 19 February 1990.

⁵⁰ Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 247, 277.

⁵¹ 'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance'. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5–6 July 1990, NATO Information Service, Brussels, July 1990.

⁵² Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 304, 305, 319.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 180, 230–235, 237, 243, 249.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 192–193, 205–206, 219–221, 233–234, 265.

⁵⁵ For a detailed discussion of the Soviet troop withdrawal issue, including both the resulting agreement of September 1990 and the subsequent implementation period, see Ulrich Brandenburg, 'The "Friends" Are Leaving. Soviet and Post-Soviet Troops in Germany', *Aussenpolitik. German Foreign Affairs Review*, 1, 1993, pp. 77–88.

⁵⁶ Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 173, 186–187; Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung* . . . , p. 77.

⁵⁷ Gorbachev's answers to the questions of a *Pravda* correspondent. *Pravda*, 21 February 1990; N. Portugalov, in an interview in *Die Welt*, 21 May 1990; E. Shevardnadze's statement at the Berlin session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 22 June 1990, *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, 14, 1990, pp. 18–19; Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 206, 273; Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung* . . . , p. 77.

⁵⁸ E. Shevardnadze's statement at the Bonn session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 5 May 1990 has been published in *Izvestiya*, 6 May 1990. For discussion of the proposal, see Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 223, 225, 235.

⁵⁹ E. Shevardnadze's statement at the Berlin session of the two-plus-four negotiations on 22 June 1990. *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, 14, 1990, pp. 18–19; Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , p. 285; Shevardnadze, *Die Zukunft* . . . , pp. 248–249; Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung* . . . , pp. 77–80.

⁶⁰ Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , p. 180.

⁶¹ Extract from the Soviet minutes of the Gorbachev–Kohl talks in Moscow, in Gorbatschow, *Gipfelgespräche* . . . , p. 174.

⁶² Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 170, 185, 200–203; Soviet 'non-paper' handed to the East German government by Ambassador Kochemasov on 16 April 1990, in *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik* . . . , pp. 162–165.

⁶³ See, *inter alia*, Vera Tolz & Elizabeth Teague, 'Prokhanov Warns of Collapse of Soviet Empire', *Report on the USSR*, 9 February 1990, pp. 1–3; Olga Alexandrova, 'Konservative Opposition gegen das "neue politische Denken"', *Aktuelle Analysen des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* [BIOst], 22, 1990, 21 March 1990.

⁶⁴ 'Zadachi u nas odni' (answers by M. A. Moiseiev to questions posed by a military journalist), *Krasnaya zvezda*, 10 February 1990.

⁶⁵ 'Dve Germanii, odna Evropa?' (transcript of a dialogue between V. M. Falin and V. I. Mikhailov), *Pravda*, 12 March 1990.

⁶⁶ Interview with A. L. Adamishin, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 25 April 1990.

⁶⁷ A case in point is the Defence Minister, Marshal Yazov; see, *inter alia*, 'Vereinigt weder in NATO noch in Warschauer Pakt', *Neues Deutschland*, 14 March 1990; Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung* . . . , p. 84.

⁶⁸ Andrew McEwen, 'Troops "Handed Arms in Warning to Gorbachev"' (information from NATO sources), *The Times*, 4 May 1990.

⁶⁹ 'Peremeny v tsentral'noi i vostochnoi Evrope. S zasedaniya Komissii TsK KPSS po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki, 15 iyunya 1990g.', *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 10, 1990, pp. 102–113.

⁷⁰ Cf. Olga Alexandrova, 'Der XXVIII. Parteitag der KPdSU und die Verlagerung der Kompetenzen in der Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik', *Aktuelle Analysen des BIOst*, 46, 1990, 23 July 1990. On Gorbachev's self-portrayal of his effort to persuade CPSU cadres see Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , p. 332.

⁷¹ For Bonn's assessment see *ibid.*, pp. 290–294.

⁷² The best known public spokesman of the developing democratic school of thought on foreign policy was V. Dashichev. For statements of his views in early 1990 see, *inter alia*, 'Die deutsche Einheit kommt—wir haben es nur nicht rechtzeitig gesehen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8 February 1990; 'U vkhoda v evropeiskii dom', *Moskovskie novosti*, 5, 1990, p. 12. My categorisation of the different schools of thought differs to some extent from the one used by Robbin F. Laird, *The Soviets, Germany, and the New Europe*, (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991), pp. 197–203, which is predominantly based on analysis of an academic spectrum.

⁷³ Modrow, *Aufbruch* . . . , p. 123; Shevardnadze, during a press conference in Moscow on 10 February 1990. *Izvestiya*, 11 February 1990.

⁷⁴ This has been noted also by Modrow, *Aufbruch* . . . , pp. 123–124. See also Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , p. 186.

⁷⁵ As the clearest evidence of this see extract from the Soviet minutes of the Gorbachev–Kohl talks in Moscow, in Gorbatschow, *Gipfelgespräche* . . . , p. 173.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 162–177; Teltschik, *329 Tage* . . . , pp. 319–324, 334–339.

⁷⁷ Text: *Pravda*, 18 July 1990.

⁷⁸ For details of this new security perception or concept, see K. Pleshakov, 'Nashi natsional'nye interesy v perekhodnyi period', *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 10, 1991, pp. 15–25.